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Abstract: We propose a new encryption system based on a nonlinear joint transform correlator (JTC)
using the information of two biometrics (one digital fingerprint for each user) as security keys of
the encryption system. In order to perform the decryption and authentication in a proper way,
it is necessary to have the two digital fingerprints from the respective users whose simultaneous
authentication is pursued. The proposed security system is developed in the Fourier domain.
The nonlinearity of the JTC along with the five security keys given by the three random phase masks
and the two digital fingerprints of the two users allow an increase of the system security against
brute force and plaintext attacks. The feasibility and validity of this proposal is demonstrated using
digital fingerprints as biometrics in numerical experiments.
Keywords: image encryption; joint transform correlator (JTC); authentication
1. Introduction
The field of image encryption using optical and optoelectronic devices has shown a great potential
to protect the information contained in these images [1–4]. One of the most important techniques for
the image encryption using optical devices is the technique of double random phase encoding (DRPE)
proposed by Réfrégier y Javidi [5]. The DRPE uses two random phase masks (RPMs) placed in the
input and the Fourier plane, respectively, of the encryption system in order to convert an original image
in a stationary white noise image (encrypted image). The DRPE can be optically implemented using
a 4f-processor [6] or a joint transform correlator (JTC) [7]. The initial JTC architecture was modified
in the works of [8–11] with the purpose of simplifying the optical setup of the encryption system,
but this modification affected the decrypted images with a poor image quality [12]. We introduced
a nonlinear modification of the JTC architecture that allowed an enhancement of the decrypted image
quality and an improvement over the security of the encrypted image [12]. The JTC used in [7–12] was
performed in the Fourier domain (FD) and it was extended from the FD to the Fresnel domain [13–17],
the fractional Fourier domain [18–21] and the Gyrator domain [22]. The nonlinear modifications of the
JTC architecture introduced in [13,14,18,19,22] allowed the retrieval of the correct decrypted images
and an improved resistance of the encryption system against brute force and plaintext attacks.
Some DRPE-based systems have been proposed for multifactor authentication [23–25]. These
optically inspired systems combine DRPE encryption, matched filter, and photon-counting techniques
for simultaneous pattern recognition of up to four signals. The distortion-invariant ID tags were
used in [24,26] to obtain encryption and authentication systems with scale and rotation invariance.
The procedure described for the distortion-invariant ID tags in [24,26] could be applied to the proposed
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encryption and authentication system to overcome, at least to some extent, the possible problems that
would arise if the information to inspect was affected by scale and rotation changes.
In this work, we present a DRPE-based encryption-decryption system that also incorporates an
authentication stage. The proposed system uses a nonlinear JTC and five security keys consisting of
three RPMs and two images to authenticate. When all five keys are used correctly in the decryption
process, the decrypted code reveals the successful authentication of the two images. Otherwise,
the validation fails. This proposal can be implemented when access to restricted areas must be
controlled with a higher level of security. In some occasions, two users may access coordinately to
the same place, or if there is only one person, two different biometrics can be considered as further
restricted level of security. Another situation where this simultaneous authentication can be applied
will be the case of identifying simultaneously a person and a vehicle or package. Random phase codes
are generated in the encryption stage, for instance being designed to allow the entrance of a particular
place or in a particular date. This idea was already mentioned in [23–25], but its implementation
followed a different procedure. The encryption algorithm was digital and none of the encrypted
signals were retrieved but just authenticated.
The novelty of this proposal compared with our previous works [12–14,18,19,22], can be described
in three different aspects. Firstly, the security system incorporates an authentication stage of the
encrypted signals. Secondly, the proposed system has in total five keys consisting of three RPMs and
two digital fingerprints of the users (two biometric images) increasing the system security. Finally,
the applied nonlinearity of the proposed system differs from previous proposals in order to achieved
a satisfactory decryption and authentication of the whole set of signals.
The triple random-phase encoding (TRPE) is the DRPE implemented with a 4f-processor that
uses one additional RPM at the output plane of the encryption system [27]. The proposed encryption
system in this work also uses three RPMs, but the DRPE technique is performed using a nonlinear JTC
architecture. In addition, the three RPMs for the TRPE are placed at the input, Fourier, and output
planes of the encryption system whereas the three RPMs for the proposed encryption system of this
work are placed at the input plane of the JTC. A new attack based on deep learning shows that the DRPE
and TRPE implemented with a 4f-processor are vulnerable [28]. The DRPE and TRPE implemented
using a 4f-processor are linear systems and the attack proposed in [28] is limited to images (plaintexts
or images to encrypt) encoded in amplitude (real-valued). This attack based on deep learning should
be adapted to nonlinear systems and images to encrypt encoded in phase (complex-valued) in order to
succeed when attacking the proposed security system of this work [12,13,18,22].
2. Encryption, Decryption, and Authentication Stages
2.1. Encryption Stage
The image to encrypt f (x, y) has only two real values: 0 or 1 (binary image). The image
f (x, y) is a code whose decryption reveals the positive validation of the two images introduced
for authentication.
The following images are RPMs
r(x, y) = exp{i2pis(x, y)}, k1(x, y) = exp{i2pin1(x, y)}, k2(x, y) = exp{i2pin2(x, y)}, (1)
where x and y are the spatial coordinates, and s(x, y), n1(x, y) and n2(x, y) are normalized positive
function generated randomly, statistically independent, and uniformly distributed with values in
the interval of [0, 1] [5]. All the functions used in the encryption and decryption stages are images
with M× N pixel size. Figure 1a shows the optical encryption scheme (part I) using a nonlinear JTC
architecture and the optical decryption scheme (part II) based on two successive Fourier transform
(4f -processors).
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(a)
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Figure 1. (a) The scheme of the optical setup composed of an encryption system based on a nonlinear
JTC architecture (part I) and a decryption system based on a 4f -processor (part II). Distributions
contained in the input plane of the (b) encryption system, and (c) decryption system.
The input plane of the JTC is composed by three data distributions spatially separated as it is
depicted in Figure 1b. The first data distribution is the function g(x, y), which is determined by the
original image to encrypt f (x, y) encoded in phase fph(x, y) = exp{i2pi f (x, y)} [29] multiplied by the
RPM r(x, y)
g(x, y) = fph(x, y)r(x, y) = exp{i2pi[ f (x, y) + s(x, y)]}. (2)
The second data distribution of the input plane of the JTC is the function h1(x, y), which is the
product of RPM k1(x, y) and the image of the digital fingerprint of the first user p1(x, y) encoded
in phase
h1(x, y) = exp{i2pip1(x, y)}k1(x, y) = exp{i2pi[p1(x, y) + n1(x, y)]}. (3)
The third data distribution of the input plane of the JTC is the function h2(x, y), given by the
product of RPM k2(x, y) by the image of the digital fingerprint of the second user p2(x, y) encoded
in phase
h2(x, y) = exp{i2pip2(x, y)}k2(x, y) = exp{i2pi[p2(x, y) + n2(x, y)]}. (4)
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The three data distributions of the input plane are phase-only distributions, which are located as
it is indicated in Figure 1b. The distribution g(x, y) is placed centred at the coordinates (x, y) = (a, b).
The second and third data distributions are centred at the coordinates (x, y) = (−a, b) and (x, y) =
(−a,−b), respectively. We assume that all three data distributions do not overlap spatially; that is,
they are nonzero in a spatial region that is not larger than 2a× 2b (and preferably smaller to avoid
border effects). The intensity of the Fourier transform of the input plane of the JTC, which is the joint
power spectrum (JPS), is given by
JPS(u, v) =
∣∣∣F {g(x− a, y− b) + h1(x+ a, y− b) + h2(x+ a, y+ b)} ∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣G(u, v)e−i2pi(au+bv) + H1(u, v)e−i2pi(−au+bv) + H2(u, v)e−i2pi(−au−bv)∣∣∣2, (5)
where u and v are the spatial frequency coordinates, the functions represented by capital letters
correspond to the Fourier transforms of the functions represented in lowercase letters.
The following intensities |G(u, v)|2, |H1(u, v)|2, and |H2(u, v)|2, which can be sequentially
captured by displaying different input planes, are subtracted from the JPS. Then, the previous result is
divided by the nonlinear term |H1(u, v)|2 + |H2(u, v)|2 in order to obtain the encrypted image E(u, v)
E(u, v) =
JPS(u, v)− [|G(u, v)|2 + |H1(u, v)|2 + |H2(u, v)|2]
|H1(u, v)|2 + |H2(u, v)|2
=
1
T(u, v)
[
G(u, v)H∗1 (u, v)e
−i2pi(2au) + G(u, v)H∗2 (u, v)e−i2pi(2au+2bv)
+ G∗(u, v)H1(u, v)e−i2pi(−2au) + H1(u, v)H∗2 (u, v)e−i2pi(2bv)
+ G∗(u, v)H2(u, v)e−i2pi(−2au−2bv) + H∗1 (u, v)H2(u, v)e
−i2pi(−2bv)
]
, (6)
where T(u, v) = |H1(u, v)|2 + |H2(u, v)|2 and the superscript ∗ denotes the complex conjugation
operation. The encrypted image E(u, v) has real values and it is obtained from four intensities
distributions. The five security keys of the encryption system are given by the three RPMs (r(x, y),
k1(x, y), and k2(x, y)) and the two images of the digital fingerprints of the two users p1(x, y)
and p2(x, y).
All the steps concerning Fourier transformations described in the encryption and decryption
procedures can be performed optically by considering the optical processor shown in Figure 1a. Optical
processing has the valuable property of inherent parallelism, which allows for fast encryption of large
volumes of data. In addition to this, the security strength of optical cryptography resides in the ability
of optics to process the information in a hyperspace of states, where variables such as amplitude,
phase, polarization, wavelength, spatial position, and fractional spatial frequency domain can all be
used to hide the signal with greater concealment [1]. Image subtraction and nonlinearity are applied
to the camera acquired intensity distributions by digital computation.
2.2. Decryption and Authentication Stages
In the decryption stage, the users willing to be authenticated provide their personal fingerprints
in-situ. These fingerprints are compared with the encrypted data, which for instance, can be attached
on an ID card.
The processor obtains the necessary random phase codes from a database, which can vary
depending on the area to access, the date, or other particular information. Once, all the required
information is available for the processor, the following step of the decryption system (Figure 1a,
part II) is to multiply the encrypted image E(u, v) by the Fourier transform of the input plane of the
decryption system (Figure 1c), and the result is
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D(u, v) = E(u, v)F {h1(x+ a, y− b) + h2(x+ a, y+ b)}
= E(u, v)
[
H1(u, v)e−i2pi(−au+bv) + H2(u, v)e−i2pi(−au−bv)
]
=
1
T(u, v)
[
G(u, v)|H1(u, v)|2e−i2pi(au+bv) + G(u, v)H1(u, v)H∗2 (u, v)e−i2pi(au+3bv)
+ G∗(u, v)H21(u, v)e
−i2pi(−3au+bv) + H21(u, v)H
∗
2 (u, v)e
−i2pi(−au+3bv)
+ G∗(u, v)H1(u, v)H2(u, v)e−i2pi(−3au−bv) + |H1(u, v)|2H2(u, v)e−i2pi(−au−bv)
+ G(u, v)H∗1 (u, v)H2(u, v)e
−i2pi(au−bv) + G(u, v)|H2(u, v)|2e−i2pi(au+bv)
+ G∗(u, v)H1(u, v)H2(u, v)e−i2pi(−3au−bv) + H1(u, v)|H2(u, v)|2e−i2pi(−au+bv)
+ G∗(u, v)H22(u, v)e−i2pi(−3au−3bv) + H∗1 (u, v)H
2
2(u, v)e
−i2pi(−au−3bv)
]
. (7)
The inverse Fourier transform of Equation (7) provides the output plane of the 4f -processor.
Different distributions are spatially separated at the output plane. For decryption purposes, only the
first and eighth terms of Equation (7) are the most relevant information in order to recover the original
image that was encrypted. The distributions in the output plane corresponding to these two terms
cover the same spatial region, centred at coordinates (a, b); the other terms, however, contribute to
the output plane with spatially separated distributions from them. Thus, considering only the first
and eighth term of Equation (7) to compute the relevant distributions of the output plane, the spatial
region centred at (a, b) is
d18(x, y) = F−1
{
G(u, v)
(|H1(u, v)|2 + |H2(u, v)|2) e−i2pi(au+bv)
|H1(u, v)|2 + |H2(u, v)|2
}
= g(x− a, y− b). (8)
The decrypted image is obtained from the function d18(x, y) as follows
2pi fˆ (x− a, y− b) = arg {d18(x, y)r∗(x− a, y− b)} , (9)
where arg is the phase of a complex-valued function. If the five security keys used in the decryption
system are the same security keys employed in the encryption system, the decrypted image fˆ (x, y) is
a replica of the original image f (x, y) utilized in the encryption system. The correct retrieval of the
original image in the decryption process is achieved through the nonlinear modifications introduced
in the JPS when the encrypted image E(u, v) is computed.
Finally, the disclosure of the successful authentication is done over the decrypted image fˆ (x, y).
If any of the five security keys used in the decryption system is different from the five security keys in
the encryption system, the decrypted image fˆ (x, y) will not be a replica of the original image f (x, y)
and therefore, the two users will not be authenticated.
3. Computational Simulations
The computational simulations of the security system proposed in Section 2 are presented in
Figure 2. The images utilized in the security system have a resolution of 300× 300 pixels and, in general,
are grayscale. The original image f (x, y) and the random code image s(x, y) of the RPM r(x, y) are
shown in Figure 2a,b, respectively. The random code images n1(x, y) and n2(x, y) of the RPMs k1(x, y)
and k2(x, y), respectively, have different values but the same appearance of the image presented in
Figure 2b. The images of the digital fingerprints of the two users are presented in Figure 2c,d, which
correspond to the functions p1(x, y) and p2(x, y), respectively.
The encrypted image E(u, v) is shown in Figure 2e. This encrypted image has a noisy appearance
that neither reveals any information of the original image f (x, y) nor the fingerprints of the users.
If the decryption process is performed using the encrypted image E(u, v) and the five security keys
(r(x, y), k1(x, y), k2(x, y), p1(x, y), and p2(x, y)) with their correct values, the original image f (x, y)
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will be recovered ideally at the output of the decryption system. The decrypted image fˆ (x, y) obtained
from the encrypted image E(u, v) and the correct values of the five security keys, is shown in Figure 2f.
(a) f (x, y) (b) s(x, y) (c) p1(x, y) (d) p2(x, y)
(e) E(u, v) (f) fˆ (x, y) (g) fˆ (x, y) (error p1(x, y)) (h) fˆ (x, y) (error k2(x, y))
Figure 2. (a) Original image to encrypt f (x, y). (b) Random code image s(x, y) of the random phase
mask (RPM) r(x, y). Images of the digital fingerprints of the two users: (c) first user p1(x, y) and
(d) second user p2(x, y). (e) Encrypted image E(u, v). (f) Decrypted image fˆ (x, y) using the correct
five security keys (r(x, y), k1(x, y), k2(x, y), p1(x, y) and p2(x, y)). Decrypted images for the following
wrong security keys: (g) the image of the digital fingerprint of the first user p1(x, y) and (h) the
RPM k2(x, y).
In this work, to evaluate the quality of the decrypted images, we use the metric of the root mean
square error (RMSE) between the decrypted image fˆ (x, y) and the original image f (x, y) [12]
RMSE =
(
∑Mx=1∑
N
y=1 [ f (x, y)− fˆ (x, y)]2
∑Mx=1∑
N
y=1 [ f (x, y)]2
) 1
2
, (10)
where M = N = 300. The RMSE metric that evaluates the quality of the the decrypted image takes
values in [0,1]; when the value of the RMSE metric is near or equal to 0, this metric indicates an excellent
quality of the image for the retrieval of the decrypted image at the output of the decryption system,
whereas the values of the RMSE metric near or equal to 1 represent a worse quality of the decrypted
image. The RMSE between the original image of Figure 2a and the decrypted image of Figure 2f is 0.057.
The decrypted image is presented in Figure 2g when a wrong image of the digital fingerprint of
the first user p1(x, y) is used in the decryption system. If the RPM k2(x, y) is wrong in the decryption
system, the decrypted image obtained is shown in Figure 2h. The values of the RMSEs between the
original image of Figure 2a and the decrypted images of Figure 2g,h are 0.87 and 0.89, respectively.
If the values of the RPMs r(x, y) and k1(x, y), and the image of the digital fingerprint of the second
user p2(x, y), employed in the decryption system are not equal to the values utilized in the encryption
system, the decrypted image will be a noisy distribution very similar to the images presented in
Figure 2g. The right retrieval of the original image at the output of the decryption system, only is
possible when the all five security keys with their correct values are used in the decryption system.
Finally, the decrypted image fˆ (x, y) of Figure 2f (which is a replica of the original image
presented in Figure 2a), is read as a QR code obtaining the successful authentication and therefore,
the simultaneous authentication of the two users using the two images of the digital fingerprints in
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the decryption process is performed in a correct way. For the images of Figure 2g,h, the operation of
authentication fails because at least one of the five security keys is wrong for the decryption process.
The key space analysis for the proposed security system consists of every possible combination
of the security keys: the three RPMs (r(x, y), k1(x, y), and k2(x, y)) and the two images of the
digital fingerprints of the two users p1(x, y) and p2(x, y). Each security key has a resolution
of 300 × 300 pixels in grayscale and each pixel has 256 possible values. A rough estimation of
the number of attempts required to retrieve the three RPMs and the two images of the digital
fingerprints of the two users, is of the order of 2565(300)(300) = 256450,000. Therefore, the brute
force attacks are intractable just considering all the possibilities of the five keys of the proposed security
system [30]. The nonlinear modifications applied on the JPS allow a better protection against the
chosen-plaintext and known-plaintext attacks than the linear cryptosystems, as it was demonstrated in
references [12,13,18,22].
4. Conclusions
We have presented a DRPE based encryption-authentication system using a nonlinear JTC
architecture, where the biometric information of two users are employed as security keys. The proposed
security system has five security keys represented by three RPMs and two images of digital fingerprints
of two users. These five security keys along with the nonlinearities introduced over the JTC are
intended to improve the security of the encrypted image against brute force and plaintext attacks. It is
necessary to have the five security keys previously mentioned, in order to obtain the right decrypted
image and to perform the authentication process in a correct way. The authentication process can be
performed, whenever the resulting image (decrypted image) of the decryption process is a replica
of the original image that was initially encrypted. The excellent quality for the decrypted image is
due to the nonlinear modifications introduced on the JTC architecture. Finally, the encryption and
decryption systems based on a JTC allow the simultaneous authentication of two users using the
biometric information of these two users.
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